

"Presidential" Address¹: The Changing Environment of Education for Public Service

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University education for public service has, from its inception, been formed by a vision of the needs of government and of our society. It has therefore changed with the changing vision of these needs. Tracing these changes over the course of this century offers a unique perspective on the evolution of American democracy; it also inspires a degree of optimism about the prospects of training for public service as the century draws to a close. I will offer an analysis of the changing environment of education for public service by developing three home truths:

- Each of the successive waves of innovation in education for public service that have swept over American higher education in the past 100 years has been linked to a distinct vision of the needs of government and the society it serves.
- The fresh understanding of these needs toward the close of this century is bringing a major shift in the traditional mission of the schools of public service.
- This shift will be reflected in the curricular and research initiatives that are mounted by these schools as we enter a new century.

SUCCESSIVE WAVES OF EDUCATIONAL INNOVATION

The variety of education for public service is a mark of the successive waves of innovation that have swept over this sector of higher education in the past 100 years, as each has left behind a legacy for the field today. I sometimes feel like a long-term guest in a residential hotel where each new set of owners has redecorated the public areas without throwing anything away. The current variety of training in public administration, public affairs, public policy, and public management is more easily understood if it is seen as the overlay

¹ The origins of this address lie in an inaugural conference on public affairs and management in the 21st century at the new School of Public Affairs of Baruch College, City University of New York.

of four successive waves, each of which was set in motion by a distinctive vision of the needs of government or American society.

The first of these was the *public administration* movement that grew out of the Progressive Era's intense desire to sever administration from a corrupt politics and make it a field of specialized professional competence. This desire was most clearly institutionalized in the council-manager plan that spread across America's small and midsize cities in the early decades of this century, although it was reflected in the civil service reforms at the state and national levels as well. Under the council-manager plan, policy was to be the province of an elective council; administration was to be the province of a professionally trained city manager and staff. This separation of policy from administration was to preserve accountability while breaking the corrupt grip of the party machines on city administrations. In his seminal paper, "The Study of Administration," Woodrow Wilson used the vivid metaphor that "if I see a murderous fellow sharpening a knife cleverly, I can borrow his way of sharpening the knife without borrowing his probable intention to commit murder" to argue that we could learn from the professionalized civil services of Europe without absorbing the antidemocratic ethos of the German Empire and other continental regimes [Wilson, 1887].

This movement to separate administration from politics spawned the first training school in public administration, mounted by the New York Bureau of Municipal Research, and at a later time the Maxwell School at Syracuse University, the School of Public Administration at the University of Southern California, and programs in public administration at the University of Michigan, the University of Minnesota, and many others. The intellectual foundations of the public administration movement seemed secure by the 1930s, when the Brownlow Committee built this professional competence into the newly designed Executive Office of the President, at the very apex of American government, and Luther Gulick, a member of the Brownlow Committee, proposed POSDCORB (an acronym before we knew what acronyms were called) to summarize the specialized skills of *Planning, Organizing, Staffing, Directing, COordinating, Reporting and Budgeting* that constituted the field of professional administration.

The irony of these capstone events is that this was exactly the period in which the foundations of the public administration movement were being undermined by the governmental experience of those who later influenced the further development of training for the public service. A number of gifted people who went into administrative positions in the government during the rapid buildup of its responsibilities in the Roosevelt New Deal and Second World War realized that it was impossible to make headway on the country's problems without becoming involved in the content of policy as well as in its administrative implementation.

This realization set in motion the second wave of innovation in training for public service, the *public affairs* movement that spread across a number of our campuses after the war. A generation of economists and public administration specialists, many of whom had seen wartime service, joined hands to create the graduate public affairs programs at Princeton University, the University of Pittsburgh, and elsewhere. Paul Appleby, a leading apostle of the new creed, left the Department of Agriculture to become the Maxwell School's dean and to give its public service training the new public affairs cast.

The doctrine of the separation of policy from administration was also called into question by the experience of those who operated the public administration movement's hallmark institution, the council-manager plan. Even before the Second World War, the study of council-manager cities, undertaken for the Social Science Research Council by Harold and Kathryn Stone and Don Price, showed how often this doctrine was ignored by many of the most effective city managers. Although some of the managers they studied were faithfully adhering to the classical separation, a number believed that good government required the manager to be policy leader as well as professional administrator—spotting crucial problems, defining policy options, and helping to build coalitions for needed actions. These findings also helped to set the stage for the reunion of policy and administration in the new public affairs programs.

During the 1950s and 1960s, the economists and the others who had turned their attention to the content of policy refined various techniques for optimizing the choices facing government. Some of these techniques were given a trial run in Robert McNamara's Department of Defense (DOD), as Charles Hitch and his colleagues from the Rand Corporation installed the DOD's Policy Planning Budgeting System (PPBS). President Lyndon Johnson declared PPBS to be such a success that he mandated its spread to the domestic side of the government, just as his administration was readying the social policy initiatives of the Great Society.

In the light of these developments, it was thought that government had an urgent need for policy analysts rigorously trained in the new optimizing techniques; this vision set in motion the third wave of innovation that swept across this higher education sector, the *public policy* movement of the late 1960s and early 1970s. Harvard University transformed the public administration program of the Littauer School of Public Administration into the public policy program of the Kennedy School of Government. The University of California at Berkeley scrapped its plans for a graduate school of public affairs and started instead its Graduate School of Public Policy. The University of Michigan remade its Institute of Public Administration into the Institute of Public Policy Studies. Duke University launched its Institute of Policy Sciences. The Ford Foundation helped the revolution along by showering resources on a group of eight public policy programs, including a doctoral program at the Rand Corporation. The ideas of the public policy movement were also congenial to a number of the earlier public affairs programs and turned up in various older public administration programs as well.

It was not long, however, before the country came to a very mixed view of what had been achieved by the Great Society. The disappointment with the results of many of the policy initiatives of the Johnson years gave rise to the view that the government might not need a set of classy policy analysts as much as it needed a set of managers who could build and administer programs and get things done—people who could ensure that what was decided in Washington, DC, bore some relation to what actually happened in Oakland, California. This view set in motion the fourth of the waves of innovation that passed over our campuses, the *public management* movement.

This wave was reflected in three kinds of developments. The first was the emergence of public management programs in the business schools. Arjay Miller arrived at Stanford University as the new dean of its business school (fresh from his efforts, as president of the Ford Motor Company, to renew

the life of Detroit), and declared that the time had come to get some line managers in government who knew something about *management*. Whatever Stanford's public management program has accomplished, it is not mainly this. On the contrary, it has often taken gifted people out of the public sector and sent them into the private consulting firms. But Stanford's initiative was emulated by a number of other business schools that started public management programs during this period.

A second development of the public management movement was the appearance of generic schools of management. Yale University launched its School of Organization and Management, offering a Master in Public and Private Management. The University of California at Irvine created a generic school of management. The Sloan School of Management at Massachusetts Institute of Technology and the J. L. Kellogg School of Management at Northwestern University remade their programs in a more generic mode. Despite the best of intentions, it has been difficult for any of these schools to maintain a balance between public and private, so strong are the forces that draw them toward the private side. In practice, it is considerably easier for a "public" school to keep open a window to the private sector than it is for a business school to maintain a strong link to the public sector. A small exception that may prove the rule is the Atkinson School of Management at Willamette University which has been helped by its location across the street from the Oregon State Capitol.

The third development of the public management movement was the new interest in management within the public policy schools themselves. Sharing the dismay over the difficulties of implementing the Great Society initiatives (the "implementation gap"), these schools no longer felt that training analysts who could optimize the policy choices of government was a sufficient goal for their institutions. There may also have been an awful moment when Harvard wondered whether it was producing policy analysts who would go to work for Yale managers. In any case, the public policy schools developed an interest in management issues that has yet to run its course. An irony in this is that the policy schools have thereby rediscovered a number of the classical problems of public administration although they conceal this from themselves by clinging to the belief that public management is something quite different from the older public administration they so strongly rejected when the public policy tide was at flood.

THE FIFTH WAVE

In the longer run, the public management movement could not fully absorb the fresh thinking about the needs of government and the broader society unleashed by the failure of the Great Society and the debacle in Vietnam. This sea change can best be understood in generational terms. The Roosevelt New Deal and the Second World War and its aftermath attracted a remarkable generation of people into the federal service. This was an era in which the national government mounted heroic measures to lift the grinding misery of the Great Depression, to win the Second World War—the only great patriotic war this country has ever fought—and to meet the challenge of the Cold War while also laying the basis of our postwar prosperity. It is hardly surprising that this generation should believe that the key to government

performance was the quality of the people the federal service could attract and hold. Indeed, it was widely thought in the early postwar years that this country would at last fall into line with all of its peer democracies and create an in-at-the-bottom, up-by-merit, lifetime career service, at least at the federal level, with a prestige commensurate with the achievements of government. They easily accepted the further belief that the example of a federal career service would induce similar changes in the practice of our states and major cities.

Even in such an era, a skeptic might have wondered how long a golden aura could surround government in a manner so unlike the American tradition. The country was, after all, born out of a denial of government authority in Revolutionary times, and this tradition was strongly reinforced in the age of Jackson. Abraham Lincoln, the most revered figure in American history, built up a lifelong storehouse of anti government humor, which served him well as he turned office-seekers away from the White House as his own patronage secretary. My guess is that if we had the evidence, the measures of trust in government that the opinion surveys reveal as having fallen so dramatically since the golden era of government would have stood no higher in the interwar years of Presidents Warren Harding, Calvin Coolidge, and Herbert Hoover than they do today.

The belief of the Second World War generation—that getting and holding good people for a career of public service is the key to government performance—had a last hurrah in the report of the Volcker Commission which devoted a great deal of space to the compensation of the career service and the downward drift of the boundary between political appointees and careerists. These problems are by no means unimportant. It is almost a pathology of contemporary national government that 3000 senior officials are political appointees with slender governmental experience and an expected tenure of less than two years. But these problems have a special urgency for those who begin from an ideal of career service. The ablest of people will not enter and remain in a such a service if they are poorly paid and deprived of capstone experiences at the height of their careers. By contrast, the Volcker Commission devoted little space to whether and how the public's appreciation of government might be dramatically improved by commensurate improvements in the quality of the service it renders its citizens, despite the soaring popularity in the private sector of management strategies (such as Total Quality Management) by which large firms were seeking to revive their fortunes by understanding and satisfying their customers. Whatever the Volcker Commission was about, it was not "shopping mall government."

No such classical lines have constrained the thinking of those who formed their view of government after the "best and the brightest" led us into the morass of Vietnam and the decidedly mixed results of the Great Society. Their aftermath was made more painful by the oil shocks and the worsening economics of the 1970s. At the end of the 1960s, riding the crest of our greatest unbroken economic expansion in peacetime, it was plausible to think that we could pay for the Great Society—and, for that matter, the Vietnam War—out of our growing economic margin. But the bill came due in the stagflation of the 1970s, fueling Proposition 13, the howls of protest against welfare cheats, and the phenomenon of national leaders running against the government in Washington. Suddenly, the politics of social policy took on a deeply zero-sum hue.

The need for effective governance was so clear that it was bound to lead those seeking to end the decline to search more widely for ways of improving the public estate. Their thinking diverged from the earlier generation's in at least three respects:

Stress on Outcomes. Instead of focusing on personnel and budgetary *inputs*, they have put their stress on outcomes and the ways government can satisfy its citizens or customers. No one can dip into the extraordinary compendium of good new ideas assembled in *Reinventing Government* without being struck by the resolve of Osborne and Gaebler [1992] to inductively ask what has achieved a real improvement in the delivery of government services, and then to ask why, emulating the earlier, enormously influential book, *In Search of Excellence*, in which Peters and Waterman [1982] inductively look for lessons in America's best-run companies. An equal accent on outcomes characterizes the reinvention movement's extension to the federal government by the National Performance Review. The departments and agencies are being challenged to invent the performance measures against which they should be judged, and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) is combining these outcomes assessments with assessments of budgetary inputs at all levels at which OMB develops the Executive Budget, right up to the director's review.

Beyond the Federal Government. The interest of the Second World War generation was understandably centered on the federal government. No such mindset constrains the current generation, and it is striking how much the reinventing government movement drew its inspiration from the state and local level, as a cursory inspection of the Osborne–Gaebler book will again show. Even the traditional ways of thinking about levels of government are being transformed. Neal Pierce, one of the apostles of the movement, declares that the old paradigm of federal–state–local is being displaced by a new paradigm of global–regional–neighborhood. This has not excluded the federal government from the attention of the reformers, as the National Performance Review again indicates. But templates showing how government performance can be improved are being sought in a variety of arenas.

Transcending Government. Whereas the Second World War generation came to think that the public interest was distinctively the responsibility of government, the newer generation does not equate public with government and takes a much livelier interest in the role of the independent and private sectors and of public–private partnerships in achieving public purposes. Implicit in this new outlook is the belief that the root distinction between public and private is not the difference between government and the private sector but the difference between the pursuit of public interest and of private gain. A number of people in the independent sector and private business were felt to be making profound contributions to the public interest, to collective needs, and to the health of the public estate, however difficult these are to define. Equally, a number of people in government were felt to be pursuing particular interests or private gain. Indeed, the collapse of public esteem for government was thought to be partly the result of the public's belief that many of the service arms of government have been run for the convenience of those who staff them. It is in the best American tradition to regard public

as a pregovernmental concept; there is a neo-Jeffersonian quality to this aspect of the change of outlook that is underway.

A metaphor for the eclipse of the older view is the partnership that has built the downtown shopping malls—Horton Plaza in San Diego, Plaza Pasadena, Pike Street Market in Seattle, Town Square in St. Paul, Quincy Market in Boston, Battery Park City in New York, and Harborplace in Baltimore. Each of these projects has been built by a collaboration of creative city or state officials and public-spirited developers that is quite different from the earlier relationship under which government cleared the land and designated the purposes for which it could be used and then awarded private developers the right to pursue these uses by an arm's length process of competitive bids. The older way admirably conformed to the strictures of public law and the criterion of equity between potential users. But it missed many creative opportunities, and all too often produced no bids at all.

These partnerships have required a profound sense of public interest on the part of the developers as well as the public officials. The partnership that built the Inner Harbor in Baltimore needed an understanding on both sides that public interest was involved. Rowse, the developer, and his people needed to understand that Mayor William Donald Schaefer had a political market to clear and that the project would founder if it lost the support of the citizens of Baltimore, just as Schaefer and his people needed to understand the present value calculations that were driving Rowse's investment decisions.

RETHINKING OUR MISSION AND CURRICULUM

All of this should lead us to rethink the mission and curriculum of our schools. To begin with, it is high time that we set aside the lingering sense of mission—matched to an earlier day's beliefs about the needs of government or the broader society—that we are preparing our graduates for lifetimes of career service in the executive agencies of government. Almost to the present day, this has been the dominant view of our graduate professional training.

I suspect that our students have, for quite a while, held a far more varied and mobile conception of the careers that lie beyond our doors. Although it is far from comprehensive, the evidence reported on recent graduates of schools of public administration, public affairs, public policy, and public management, as well as those of schools of international affairs, indicates that a only a minority actually pursue anything resembling a lifetime career in the executive agencies of government. This is almost *necessarily* true, in view of the neo-Jacksonian realities that long since overwhelmed the postwar ideal of an in-at-the-bottom, up-by-merit, lifetime career service. What we need to do is to make our neo-Jacksonian system work for the public interest.

My own school, The Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton University, has accepted this challenge. Today we define our educational mission as one of attracting students who have a profound commitment to the public interest; of reinforcing this commitment during their years at Princeton, as we also equip them with additional skills and knowledge; and then of sending them on to careers in which they pursue the public interest in widely diversified and changing career settings. Some do indeed pursue the public interest as career civil servants. But some pursue the public interest as elective or

appointive government officials, as leaders in the independent sector, or as entrepreneurs and managers in the private sector. A number move across the thresholds between the public, independent, and private sectors, some more than once. We clearly are producing graduates who may sit on either side of the table in the negotiations that built the downtown shopping malls and might sit on different sides of the table at different stages of their careers, although with a due sense of avoiding a revolving door. A number move across the thresholds between the several levels of public service—international, national, regional, local—some again more than once. There is by no means a net drift *away* from government. About one half take a first job in the public sector. Only a slightly lower fraction work in government later in their careers. But this apparent stability conceals an impressive mobility in each direction.

To illustrate this pattern, let me sketch the careers of three of our graduates, one of whom went through our School in the 1960s, one at the end of the 1970s, and one in the early 1980s. As their careers intertwined, all three held commissionerships in the city of New York during Edward Koch’s tenure as mayor:

- *Jack Krauskopf’s* career has been highly mobile and has included several stints in academic life as well as in government. After graduating from the School, he went to work as an intern in the mayor’s office in New York City, and became special assistant to the administrator of the Human Resources Administration when this superagency was created during the Lindsay years. He then interspersed posts at Rutgers University and Princeton with government jobs in Cleveland, Newark, Wisconsin, and again New York City, where he spent five and one-half years as deputy administrator and then administrator of the Human Resources Administration. When he left the commissioner’s office he became vice president at the New School for Social Research and is now dean of the Graduate School of Management and Urban Policy there.
- *Tony Shorris’s* career, although not as long, has been very mobile within the New York region and has included periods in the private consulting firms. After graduating from the School, he did some consulting and went to work for New York City’s Department of General Services. He shifted to the Office of Management and Budget, where he was ultimately deputy director, before becoming Mayor Koch’s commissioner of finance. Along the way he oversaw operations at three Democratic National Conventions. At the end of the Koch years, he joined the consulting firm of Hamilton, Rabinovitz & Altschuler, with clients drawn from a wide variety of federal, state, and local government agencies as well as independent sector organizations. He then spent four years as first deputy executive director of the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, where he led the heroic work of reopening the World Trade Center after the bomb attack. He is now chief operating officer of Health First, a nonprofit health maintenance organization [HMO] that is binding together the 17 voluntary hospitals of New York City to better equip them to deal with the management of risk in a new era of managed health care.
- *Mike Huerta’s* career began with six years at Coopers & Lybrand Management Consulting Services, and he has applied the resulting financial

skills to a number of government problems. After graduating from the School, he joined Coopers & Lybrand's Washington D.C., office and from this base worked on government and corporate projects in the Caribbean and elsewhere. He was then recruited by Mayor Koch as commissioner of the New York City Department of Ports, International Trade and Commerce, where he was credited with transforming a South Brooklyn container terminal into Cocoa Port, generating new business for New York by aggressively competing with other regional ports. He left New York to become executive director for the Port of San Francisco and is now in the Clinton administration as associate deputy secretary of the Department of Transportation and director of the Office of Intermodalism.

CURRICULAR AND RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS

All of this also has profound implications for the curriculum of the schools of public affairs. As our graduates pursue the public interest in increasingly varied and changing career settings, they are well served by the curricular legacy of prior waves of innovation, especially the introduction of microeconomics, statistics, and other analytic disciplines during the public affairs and public policy movements, a development that was not countered by the public management movement, because these subjects had long since established themselves in the management curriculum. Still, we need to rethink what we teach in the light of career realities.

Let me illustrate this point in terms of the suggestive metaphor of the partnerships that built the downtown shopping malls. For our graduates to function effectively on either side of the table, they will need at least five general and transferrable skills that our schools can help them develop:

- Financial Analysis. They will need to be able to calculate the present value of future costs and income streams that underlie the decisions of the private developers and to understand the other financial aspects of this public-private deal, partly to avoid giving away more than is needed if they sit on the public side of the table.
- Negotiation. They will need to be able to bargain skillfully for both separate and mutual advantage; indeed, part of the reason for entering into these longer term relationships is the greater insight this gives the two sides into how they can create the shared gains that bargaining so often leaves on the table.
- Political Analysis. They will need to know how to unpack a complex political situation and its institutional context by identifying the principal players; by understanding their interests, incentives, and information; and by knowing how the purposive actions of a political entrepreneur can change these to move the parties toward worthwhile goals.
- Legal Analysis. They will need to understand how the actions of the parties are constrained by the legal context in which they operate; indeed, because public purpose is involved, they will need to understand how the project is an implementation of public law and not simply a private bargain enforceable in the courts.
- Ethical Analysis. They will need to match their commitment to public

purpose with the ability to think clearly about the ethical dilemmas that can easily arise in a close, long-term relationship in which enormous resources are at stake.

This illustrative, "fifth-wave" list is by no means exhaustive. In many respects it is not new; I have no doubt that William E. Mosher, the great dean of the Maxwell School during the interwar years, might feel that my skills overlapped those the Maxwell curriculum sought to impart in the heyday of the public administration movement, when Mosher's school embodied the POSDCORB vision of professional administration. But the list is in fact *very* different. Viewed against the changing environment of public service I have sketched, it gives a useful glimpse of the challenges we face in adapting the educational experiences of our students to the varied and highly mobile careers in which they will pursue the public interest in the year 2001 and beyond.

Certainly this list helps to make clear the importance of *values* in the mission and curriculum of our schools. Their commitment to public interest may bring us our students and create an institutional culture that is strikingly different from a business school's or a law school's culture. We can reinforce this commitment, though, by giving our students a better grasp of the importance of public law and a greater capacity to think clearly about issues that have ethical dimensions. In my own view, to say that the effort to reinvent the federal government through the National Performance Review violates the implementation of public law as defined by Congress—as Ronald Moe [1994] has in a recent critique—is to throw out the baby with the bathwater. But it is exceedingly important for our students to develop an understanding of our tradition of public law and the system of moral reasoning that has been developing in the Western tradition for more than 2000 years. If we needed further evidence on this dual point, the legal lapses of President Reagan's national security staff and the ethical lapses of his Housing and Urban Development staff show how unlikely it is that those who did not long ago understand Grover Cleveland's dictum that "a public office is a public trust" will grasp its meaning as they walk in the door.

Our accent on serving the public interest is more important because we are swimming against a tide. As the revolutions of 1989 demolished the peculiar vision of collective interest embodied in the command economies and one-party regimes of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, some were quick to conclude that the economic salvation of the human spirit must lie in the pursuit of private gain through market institutions and that the political salvation of the human spirit must lie in the pursuit of particular or private interest through the institutions of pluralist democracy.

Both conclusions are deeply misguided. Certainly it is important to give full scope to the energies unleashed by the search for private gain in the market (with its invisible hand) and by the search for particular advantage in democratic institutions. But neither the institutions of the market nor of pluralist democracy will work unless they are sustained by people who are genuinely committed to a *general* or *public* interest and are prepared to devote their lives to it.

These curricular challenges are closely aligned with—and will provoke a welcome interest in—the opportunities for research that face our schools. Indeed, each item on my fifth-wave list has the potential to be a growth

industry in research terms. It is also true that research can sharpen our sense of curricular need, as the conspicuous differences in outcomes between sites that were revealed by the early social experiments highlighted the importance of administrative capacity and helped awaken the interest in management in the policy schools.

Let me detail these dual points in terms of the second item on my list, the importance of negotiating skills. Several researchers who have creatively thought about bargaining for mutual gain have been led to think broadly about the public management problem of how political entrepreneurs can achieve their goals in the "virtual" organizations where responsibility for program outcomes far outstrips hierarchical authority. In this situation, a great deal will turn on the political entrepreneurs' ability to negotiate a network of agreements with those whose cooperation is needed to achieve the goals of the virtual organization, an insight with high relevance to a world of government downsizing and outsourcing. As it is developed in the work of David Lax and James Sebenius [1986], this insight has clear links to Richard Elmore's [1980] work on backward mapping and to the work of the partisans of the "new economics of organizations" who have explored the role of contracts in binding agents to principals. It also has links with the work of Richard Neustadt [1960] on *Presidential Power* and the work on bureaucratic politics by Allison [1971] and others who have been inspired by Neustadt, since the skills of the negotiator are so involved in political effectiveness. In the highly transactional world of presidential leadership, where presidents will typically be held accountable for outcomes far beyond their power to command, these skills are essential; to Neustadt's central insight that "Executive power is the power to persuade," which Larry Lynn has called a "defining aphorism for public management," we often might add ". . . by cutting a mutually beneficial deal."

Let me offer another example of how research is likely both to sharpen and to be inspired by our sense of the new mission of our schools. As our graduates move between widely varied job settings in the course of their mobile careers they will often encounter differences in organization culture—the beliefs, values, and reciprocal expectations that can exercise such a powerful normative influence on those who make up organizations. Our students will need to understand the nature of such cultures, how these cultures can promote or block program goals, how they are maintained, and how creative leadership can form or change them. So will we.

The search for better research answers will lead us over a broad terrain of organization theory and management science. Part of this terrain belongs to the "human relations" approach of Likert and others, including the X, Y, and Z theories of organization; part of it belongs to the new institutionalism of March and others [see March and Olsen, 1984]; and part belongs to the emerging work of Putnam and others on social capital [see Putnam, 1993]. The search will certainly lead us over the ground of the reinventing government movement, since a change in organization culture is essential to its success. A sense of institutional mission will further guide the search in a key respect: We will seek a better understanding of organization culture not as an end in itself but as a means of empowering organizations to achieve worthwhile goals. The perspective is not that of an external observer who forms a detached or *copernican* understanding of organizations; it is rather the *ptolemaic* perspective of the future actor in situations, a political entrepreneur or leader

who needs to understand organization culture in order to achieve policy and program goals.

To be sure, our schools are not only educational ventures. We are also centers of inquiry that ought to have diversified portfolios of basic but use-inspired research. I am not suggesting that every study we undertake should be shaped by our educational mission. The longest continuing research program in the Woodrow Wilson School is our Office of Population Research, launched in the interwar years by a group of analytical demographers who believed that population policy could be firmly based only if the basic processes of fertility and mortality were understood at a far more fundamental level. When their early, highly abstract models of population replacement were applied to the developing countries after the war, the world was given its first glimpse (fewer decades ago than we now recall) of the stupendous force of the population explosion that lay in prospect—an explosion that has had massive implications for policy. It would be wrong to say that this research bears no relationship to our educational mission. There is a flourishing link at the doctoral level, and a number of our masters students earn a certificate in population policy. But the work of this Office and a great deal of research elsewhere in the School is a testament to our sense that we have a responsibility to mount a broad spectrum of rigorous yet problem centered studies.

All the same, the joint product of research and education is a glory of the modern university, and part of the research mounted by schools of public service *ought* to shape and be inspired by an emerging sense of educational mission. What I have said may be enough to suggest how deeply our research as well as our curricula can be renewed by the fresh wave of innovation that is passing over our schools—a wave that is keyed to the vision of a society that needs a flow of gifted and highly skilled individuals who are dedicated to the public or general interest and are prepared to pursue it in remarkably diversified career settings during the course of their lifetimes.

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